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Stochastic optimization remains the principal paradigm for analyzing eco-
nomic decision making whether it concerns expected utility maximization by
households, expected proﬁt maximization by ﬁrms or optimal monetary pol-
icy design by central banks. As to monetary policy, central bank staﬀ now
routinely use macroeconomic models to compute policy rules that aim to
minimize expected losses under a variety of economic shocks and parameter
values. Such rules form part of regular staﬀ input into central bank decision
making. Even members of central bank boards have emphasized implications
of expected loss minimization under uncertainty such as Brainard’s (1967)
prescription of caution in policy making.
Recent research has proposed worst-case analysis—also referred to as min-
imax or robust control—as an alternative paradigm for economic decision
making in general, and monetary policy design in particular.1 So far, how-
ever, this literature has delivered mixed results concerning the implications
of worst-case analysis for the practice of monetary policy. It is criticized for
prescribing extreme policy activism and for focusing on very unlikely events
(cf. Svensson (2000), Sims (2001)). It is perceived as highly technical and
not conducive to practical application.
This paper aims to show that worst-case analysis oﬀers intuitive policy
1An early advocate of worst-case analysis in monetary policy design was von zur
Muehlen (1982). More recent contributions include Sargent (1999), Onatski and Stock
(2002), Giannoni (2002), Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001) and Zakovic, Rustem and
Wieland (2002). For applications in other areas of economic decision making see Hansen
and Sargent (2001) and the forthcoming monograph of Hansen and Sargent.
1prescriptions and can be of great use for the practice of monetary policy. To
this end, we adopt a worst-case robust strategy following Rustem and Howe
(2002) and Rustem and Zakovic (2004) rather than the H-inﬁnity approach
discussed by Basar and Bernard (1991) and others, and recently applied
by contributors to the monetary policy literature. We compare worst-case
analysis to expected loss minimization using a small macroeconomic model
estimated for the euro area by Orphanides and Wieland (2000).2
First, we show that worst-case analysis and expected loss minimization
deliver identical policy rules under strict inﬂation targeting as long as the
model used is linear and the uncertainty due to economic shocks is additive
and symmetric. In this case, the optimal rule under both approaches is
identical to the optimal rule in the absence of shocks, that is, certainty-
equivalence applies.
Next, we relax the assumptions of symmetric shocks, known parameters
and strict inﬂation targeting. As to the shocks we show that worst-case
analysis provides a straightforward approach for incorporating and insur-
ing against an asymmetric balance of risks. As to the parameters it is well
known that uncertainty regarding policy eﬀectiveness, which is a multiplica-
tive parameter3, leads to more moderate policy responses under expected loss
minimization—Brainard’s (1967) principle of cautionary policy. We show
that the same principle applies under worst-case analysis in our model. In
2The model is similar to Svensson (1997) and Ball (1999). Sargent (1999) applied
H-inﬁnity robust control to Ball’s model.
3The respective parameter in our model is the interest-rate sensitivity of aggregate
demand.
2fact, depending on the range of possible parameter values considered, worst-
case analysis may even lead to somewhat more cautious policy responses
than expected loss minimization. Flexible inﬂation targeting, which includes
output in the loss function4, implies a trade-oﬀ between output and inﬂation.
It is well known that this trade-oﬀ leads to a more moderate policy response
to inﬂation deviations from target under ﬂexible than under strict inﬂation
targeting. We obtain the same result under worst-case analyis. Quanti-
tatively though, the moderating eﬀect is smaller than under expected loss
minimization.
Then, we proceed to consider uncertainty with regard to all parameters
in the model. Again we ﬁnd that Brainard’s principle of cautionary policy
extends from expected loss minimization to worst-case analysis. Following
Orphanides and Wieland (2000) we go beyond the initial linear model and
allow for nonlinearity in the inﬂation-unemployment trade-oﬀ. Both algo-
rithms we use in this paper, the mean-variance optimization due to Zakovic
et al (2004) and the minimax algorithm due to Rustem and Howe (2002) and
Rustem and Zakovic (2004), directly extend to nonlinear models.5
Finally, we illustrate the insurance properties of worst-case analysis com-
pared to expected loss minimization. Minimax is shown to provide insurance
cover for a given range of shocks and parameter values by establishing the
maximum loss over this range. The desired range needs to be speciﬁed by
4The terminology of strict and ﬂexible inﬂation targeting is adopted from Svensson
(1997).
5The approach we use for computing optimal response parameters in feedback rules is
based on Karakitsos and Rustem (1984) and its extension to robust policies in Rustem
(1994).
3the policy maker. We obtain a measure of the cost of insurance for a chosen
range of shocks and parameters. This cost is best expressed in terms of the
deterioration in the expected loss criterion that results from implementing
the minimax policy. In practical terms, we propose that an inﬂation target-
ing central bank consider the equivalent increase in inﬂation variability when
choosing the range of uncertainties it wants to cover by means of worst-case
analysis.
2 The model
We use a simple macroeconomic model similiar to Svensson (1997), Ball
(1999) and Orphanides (2003). This model has been estimated by Or-
phanides and Wieland (2000) with annual euro area data from 1976 to 1998.
It explains the relationships between three key macroeconomic variables, in-
ﬂation, πt, the output gap, yt and the short-term nominal interest rate, it,
which is the instrument of monetary policy. For simplicity, the dynamic
structure is collapsed to a single lag of output and inﬂation and inﬂation ex-
pectations are assumed to be backward-looking and equal to past inﬂation.
Under these assumptions, the real interest rate, rt, is deﬁned as
rt = it − πt. (1)
Output depends positively on its own lag and negatively on the real interest
rate according to the following simple aggregate demand equation:
yt+1 = ρyt − ξrt + ut+1. (2)
4A standard accelerationist Phillips curve relates inﬂation to lagged inﬂation
and the output gap:
πt+1 = πt + αyt+1 + et+1 (3)
The model parameters are α,ξ > 0a n dρ ∈ [0,1), while et+1,u t+1 are zero–
mean normally distributed shocks. In addition, Orphanides and Wieland
(2000) consider a nonlinear speciﬁcation of the Phillips curve:
πt+1 = πt + αzZ(yt+1;ς)+et+1. (4)
The function Z(y;ς;c) is approximately zero in a range of width ς and linear
outside that range.6 An example of such a “zone-linear” Phillips curve is
shown in Figure 1. The euro area parameter estimates obtained by Or-
phanides and Wieland (2000) are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Model Estimates
ρ 0.77 (0.11)
ξ 0.40 (0.10)
σu 0.84
α 0.34 (0.13)
σe 0.96
αz 0.81 (0.28)
ς 2.0
σe,z 0.94
Values in parenthesis are stan-
dard errors. σu, σe, σe,z are
standard deviations of shocks.
6The exact speciﬁcation of Z used by Orphanides and Wieland is Z(y;ς;c)=y −
1
2

c +( y + ς
2)2 + 1
2

c +( −y + ς
2)2 where c is set to 0.1.
5Figure 1: Linear and Zone-Linear Phillips Curves
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Notes: The dotted line plots the linear Phillips curve
πt+1 = πt + αy t+1. The solid line plots the zone-linear
Phillips curve πt+1 = πt+αz Z(yt+1;ζ)w i t has l o p eαz >α .
We have chosen this model for its simplicity and its usefulness for organiz-
ing our results in terms of key concepts frequently encountered in monetary
policy discussions. Even in such a simple model solving for stochastically
optimal or minimax policies under general parameter and shock uncertainty
remains a nontrivial exercise. The simplicity of the model of course comes
at a cost. Speciﬁcally, the model is not derived from optimizing household
and ﬁrm behavior and abstracts from explicit forward-looking modeling of
expectations.7
7Thus, we do not take into account the interaction of policy design and private ex-
pectations formation, we cannot distinguish between discretion and commitment in poli-
cymaking and we cannot address questions of policy credibility. In future work, we plan
to extend the stochastic optimization algorithm and the mini-max algorithm used in this
6However, we adopt an important lesson from models with forward-looking
expectations formation by focusing on the choice of a simple Taylor (1993)-
style interest rate rule rather than choosing interest rates on a period-by-
period basis.8 Thus, the central bank’s decision problem consists of choosing
the response parameters xπ and xy in the following rule:
it = πt + xπ(πt − π
∗)+xyyt (5)
where π∗ denotes the central bank’s inﬂation target. The choice of policy pa-
rameters will be made with respect to the central bank’s preferences regarding
output and inﬂation performance. We assume a conventional speciﬁcation of
these preferences in form of the following per-period loss function
lt+s = ω(πt+s − π
∗)
2 +( 1− ω)y
2
t+s,ω ∈ (0,1). (6)
Following the terminology of Svensson (1997) ω = 1 corresponds to strict
inﬂation targeting and 0 <ω<1 to ﬂexible inﬂation targeting.
3 Stochastic optimization versus worst-case
analysis
Expected loss minimization as of period t implies choosing the parameters of
the policy rule, xπ and xy in equation (5), so as to minimize the expected
discounted sum of future per-period losses from t+1 onwards subject to the
paper to account for explicit forward-looking expectations formation. A strength of our
current algorithms is that they can handle nonlinear speciﬁcations of the economy, such
as the zone-linear Phillips curve in (4) without diﬃculty.
8See also Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999, 2003) for the beneﬁts of simple rules and
Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001) for an analysis of simple rules under robust control.
7equations determining the dynamics of output, inﬂation and interest rates:
min
xπ,xy Et
 ∞ 
s=1
β
t+s−1lt+s

s.t. (2),(3),(5) (7)
Here β denotes the constant discount factor. In forming expectations re-
garding future losses the central bank needs to consider a wide range of
uncertainties. We summarize uncertainty regarding parameters and shocks
in the vector v =[ ξ,ρ,α,w], where future shocks are collected in the vector
w =[ ( u1,e 1),(u2,e 2),...]. The central bank’s objective can then simply be
expressed as a function f(x,v) of the vector of policy choices x and the vector
of uncertainties v:
f(x,v)=
∞ 
s=1
β
t+s−1lt+s(πt+s(x,v),y t+s(x,v)), (8)
In this notation inﬂation and output are also expressed as functions of x and
v,t h a ti sπ(x,v)a n dy(x,v). These functions are determined by equations
(2), (3) and (5). Of course, in the nonlinear version of the model equation
(3) will be replaced with equation (4) in deﬁning π(x,v).9
Using the function f() deﬁned by (8) the problem of minimizing expected
losses can simply be written as
min
xπ,xy Et,v(f(x,v)), (9)
where Ev refers to the expectation with respect to the uncertain variables
v, which is deﬁned as v = v + ν,w h e r eν is normally distributed with
zero mean and standard deviation Λ ∼N (0,Λ). Parameter estimates and
standard deviations of parameters and shocks are obtained from Table 1.
9Note also that the nonlinear or zone-linear speciﬁcation nests the standard linear
speciﬁcation with a zone of zero width ς =0 .
8Compared to expected loss minimization worst-case analysis oﬀers an
important advantage. Worst-case analysis does not require any knowledge
regarding the probability distributions of unknown parameters and shocks.
Instead, the decision maker guards against particular bad outcomes by acting
as if he would play a game against nature. In this game nature chooses
shocks and parameters to maximize the loss function, while the decision
maker chooses the controls to minimize the loss. Thus, following the worst-
case approach the central bank in our model chooses xπ and xy in order to
minimise the discounted sum of future per-period losses with respect to the
worst possible outcomes of the uncertain shocks ut and et and parameters
(α,δ,ρ,ξ) that are summarized in the vector of uncertainties, v:
min
x max
v f(x,v),
s.t. v ≤ v ≤ v. (10)
We refer to this minimax approach as box–constrained. v and v constitute
the upper and lower bounds for the uncertain parameters and shocks. These
bounds need to bet set by the decision maker. The decision rule derived
from (10) then limits the maximum loss over the range deﬁned by these
bounds. In other words, this decision rule represents an insurance policy
that no worse loss will occur over the set range. Note however, that there
may exist multiple global maxima. A question that arises naturally in this
context concerns the rationale for setting a speciﬁc range. This question is
nontrivial when the possible range is inﬁnite. We will provide a practical
answer to this question later in this paper.
9H∞ robust control as presented in Basar and Bernhard (1991) constitutes
an alternative worst-case approach. Contrary to the minimax approach out-
line above no interval for the possible value of uncertainties is given. Instead,
the H∞ approach solves the transformed minimax problem:
min
x max
v f(x,v) − γ
2 v 
2
2, (11)
where γ = γ(v,v). The main problem of this approach is the proper choice
of γ.I fγ is large, it will force  v →0. On the other hand, if γ is too small
it may force  v →∞ . H∞ seeks the values of γ that renders the minimax
problem convex in x and concave in v. It yields a robust solution that is also
a saddle point but does so for a transformed objective.
We now turn to the numerical computation of optimal policies under
stochastic optimization and minimax analysis with box constraints. In both
cases, we approximate the inﬁnite horizon objective function with a long
but ﬁnite horizon of 20 periods. The discount factor is set to β =0 .9a n d
the central bank’s inﬂation target to π∗ = 0. The parameter values and
standard deviations are set as reported in Table 1 for the annual euro area
model of Orphanides and Wieland (2000). We will consider the linear as well
as the nonlinear speciﬁcation of the economy. For detailed descriptions of
the nonlinear stochastic optimization and minimax algorithms we refer the
reader to Zakovic et al. (2004) and Rustem and Zakovic (2004) respectively.
104 Optimal policy rules under stochastic opti-
mization and worst-case analysis
4.1 A benchmark case
First, we consider a benchmark speciﬁcation, for which expected loss mini-
mization and minimax analysis with box constraints imply identical optimal
policy rules. This benchmark corresponds to the linear-quadratic decision
problem with a single target variable, known parameters and symmetric
shocks. In other words, our benchmark case is a strict inﬂation targeting
central bank, (ω = 1), which only faces uncertainty regarding the additive
and symmetric shocks, u and e, in the linear model deﬁned by equations (2),
(3) and (5). By symmetry of the shocks we mean that expected loss mini-
mization is conducted with respect to normal distributions that are symmet-
ric around a zero mean, while the minimax problem with box constraints is
solved with upper and lower bounds that are symmetric around zero.
The solution under expected loss minimization is very simple and famil-
iar. Being only concerned with inﬂation the central bank can choose the
policy response coeﬃcients, xπ and xy, such that all predictable variation
in inﬂation is oﬀset by movements in the real interest rate and output gap.
This is possible because the policy rule (5) contains both pre-determined
or state variables of the model, lagged inﬂation and the lagged output gap.
Consequently, this rule nests the optimal policy under discretion. The as-
sumptions under the benchmark case ensure that the solution to the inﬁnite
horizon stochastic optimization problem deﬁned by (8) and (9) is identical
11to the solution of the following one-period problem:10
min
xπ,xy Et(πt+1 − π
∗)
2
s.t. yt+1 = ρyt − ξ(it − πt)+ut+1, (12)
πt+1 = πt + αyt+1 + et+1
it = πt + xπ(πt − π
∗)+xyyt
e ∼N(0,σ e),u∼N(0,σ u)
From this one-period problem it is immediately apparent that the following
setting of the policy response parameters
x
ELM
π =
1
αξ
=7 .35 ,x
ELM
y =
ρ
ξ
=1 .93 (13)
implies that πs = es + αus for all periods s = t +1 ,t+2 ,...,∞.T h u s ,a s
stated above all predictable variation in inﬂation is oﬀset by policy and actual
inﬂation will follow a purely random process. Furthermore, the optimal rule
in the model with additive normally distributed shocks is identical to the
optimal rule in the absence of those shocks. Thus, certainty-equivalence
applies and the optimal response parameters are independent of the degree
of uncertainty.
Given the solution for the benchmark case under expected loss minimiza-
tion it is perhaps not surprising that the solution under minimiax analysis
with symmetric upper and lower bounds on shocks e and u turns out to be
identical:
x
minimax
π =
1
αξ
=7 .35 ,x
minimax
y =
ρ
ξ
=1 .93 (14)
10This point has also been made by Svensson (1997) in the context of strict inﬂation
targeting.
12The minimax problem also exhibits certainty-equivalence. For example, we
obtain identical response coeﬃcients when considering symmetric bounds
such as (u/u) = ( –/+ kσu)a n d( e/e) = ( –/+ kσe) for all values of the
factor k ∈{ 0.5,1,1.5}.11
In the remainder of the paper we generalize the central bank’s decision
problem and consider additional uncertainties while comparing the resulting
policy response coeﬃcients to the above benchmark policy.
4.2 An asymmetric balance of risks
Having established certainty-equivalence under the common benchmark of
symmetric additive uncertainty our ﬁrst modiﬁcation is to consider asym-
metries in the uncertainty. While such asymmetry is rarely discussed in
academic studies, it is standard fare of monetary policy debates under the
term ’balance of risks’. Monetary policy makers often perceive information
that may bias their assessment of current uncertainties in one direction or
the other.
Including an asymmetric balance of risks in standard stochastic optimiza-
tion analysis would require specifying probability distributions for the shocks
that are biased in one of the directions. Instead, worst-case analysis oﬀers an
easier route to guard against the dangers arising from an asymmetric balance
of risks. The central bank may simply specify a greater upper or lower bound
in the minimax problem with box constraints depending on the direction of
the perceived risks. Such an asymmetry will break the certainty-equivalence
11As reported in Table 1 σu =0 .84 and σe =0 .96.
13result obtained above and modify the required policy response.
We illustrate the eﬀect of an asymmetric balance of risks in the minimax
problem with box constraints by comparing three scenarios: (i) symmetric
bounds (benchmark), (ii) (u = −0.5σu,e = −0.5σe)a n d( u = σu,e = σe),
(high) and (iii) (u = −σu,e = −σe)a n d( u =0 .5σu,e =0 .5σe)( l o w ) . I n
scenario (ii) the greater risk is on the high side, while on the low side in
scenario (iii).
Table 2 reports the optimal policy response coeﬃcients under the three
scenarios speciﬁed above. Our ﬁndings conﬁrm that asymmetry of the bal-
ance of risks breaks certainty-equivalence. Thus, the policy response depends
on the degree of asymmetry. For the scenarios considered, the response coef-
ﬁcients with asymmetric risks are found to be smaller than with symmetric
risks.
Table 2: Asymmetric risks
minimax xπ xy
(i) symmetric risk 7.35 1.93
(ii) high-side risk 6.02 1.75
(iii) low-side risk 6.44 1.77
4.3 Uncertainty regarding policy eﬀectiveness
With respect to stochastic optimization it is well known that multiplicative
parameter uncertainty breaks the certainty-equivalence principle and intro-
duces caution in decision making. In the monetary policy literature such
parameter uncertainty is often referred to as Brainard uncertainty due to the
14original contribution of Brainard (1967). He showed that the degree of policy
activism varies inversely with the extent of uncertainty about policy eﬀective-
ness. Consequently, the response coeﬃcients xπ and xy in our model should
vary inversely with the standard deviation of the interest-rate sensitivity of
aggregate demand, ξ. As reported previously the euro area estimate of ξ in
Orphanides and Wieland (2000) is equal to 0.40 with a standard deviation
σξ of 0.10.
In the ﬁrst two columns of Table 3 we report the optimal policy co-
eﬃcients under expected loss minimization for three levels of uncertainty
regarding the interest rate sensitivity of aggregate demand: (i) half the es-
timated standard deviation, (ii) the estimated standard deviation, and (iii)
1.5 times the estimated standard deviation.
Table 3: Uncertainty regarding ξ
ELM minimax
xπ xy xπ xy
Benchmark 7.35 1.93 7.35 1.93
(i) 0.5σξ 7.08 1.88 6.80 1.87
(ii) σξ 6.55 1.84 6.62 1.74
(iii) 1.5σξ 6.01 1.82 6.33 1.64
ELM: expected loss minimization.
The results reported under the heading ELM conﬁrm the Brainard princi-
ple. Increasing uncertainty regarding ξ leads to a reduction in the optimal
responsiveness of the policy rule to output and inﬂation ﬂuctuations. The
coeﬃcient on inﬂation declines from 7.35 to 6.01 while the coeﬃcient on the
output gap declines from 1.93 to 1.82. As a consequence, the central bank
15conducts interest rate policy in a more cautious manner.
The third and fourth column of Table 3 show the optimal policy coeﬃ-
cients under minimax analysis with box constraints. We consider three sets
of symmetric upper and lower bounds: (i) (ξ/ξ)=( 0 .40 –/+ 0.5σξ), (ii)
(ξ/ξ)=( 0 .40 –/+ σξ), and (iii) (ξ/ξ)=( 0 .40 –/+ 1.5σξ).
Our ﬁrst important ﬁnding is that the Brainard principle also applies
under minimax with box constraints. Widening the upper and lower bounds
symmetrically leads to a reduction in the optimal policy coeﬃcients. The
coeﬃcient on inﬂation declines from 7.35 to 6.33, while the coeﬃcient on
output falls from 1.93 to 1.64. This ﬁnding strikes a diﬀerent note than
recent discussions in the literature which have emphasized that worst-case
analysis tends to imply a greater extent of policy activism to guard against
particularly bad outcomes (cf. Sargent (1999), Onatksi and Stock (2002)).
A second interesting ﬁnding is that the degree of policy cautiousness
may be more or less pronounced under minimax with box constraints than
under expected loss minimization depending on the range of parameter values
considered.
4.4 Flexible inﬂation targeting
If one were to compare the optimal policy rules we have computed so far with
estimated rules, it would become immediately apparent that the coeﬃcient
on inﬂation deviations from target is extremely large. We have obtained
optimal values of xπ between 6.0 and 7.5, because we have focused on a
strict inﬂation targeting central bank, (ω = 1). Such a central bank aims
16to eliminate all predictable variation in inﬂation in our benchmark case with
known parameters and additive symmetric shocks. Predictable variation in
output, however, is very large under such a policy. Thus, including output
deviations from potential in the central bank loss function appears more
relevant from an empirical perspective.
Table 4: Flexible inﬂation targeting
ELM minimax
xπ xy xπ xy
Benchmark 7.35 1.93 7.35 1.93
ω =0 .5 1.86 1.93 5.21 1.87
ELM: expected loss minimization.
For this reason, we consider a ﬂexible inﬂation targeting central bank
that assigns equal weight to output and inﬂation in the loss function, (i.e.
ω =0 .5 in equation (6)). Optimal policy coeﬃcients are reported in Table
4. As expected the optimal value of xπ under expected loss minimization is
much smaller, 1.86 instead of 7.35. The coeﬃcient on inﬂation also declines
under minimax analysis but to a lesser extent than under expected loss min-
imization. Interestingly, under minimax analysis (with symmetric standard
deviation bounds on the shocks) both policy coeﬃcients decline as we move
from strict to ﬂexible inﬂation targeting.
4.5 Uncertainty regarding all parameters and shocks
We are now ready to proceed with a comparison of expected loss minimiza-
tion and minimax analysis for ﬂexible inﬂation targeting taking into account
17uncertainty regarding all parameters and shocks in our model. First, we con-
duct this comparison for the linear version of our model, which consists of
equations (2), (3) and (5) and then for the nonlinear version where the linear
Phillips curve, equation (3), is replaced with the zone-linear Phillips curve
deﬁned by equation (4) and previously shown in Figure 1.
Linear model
The linear model contains three unknown parameters, the interest-rate
sensitivity of aggregate demand, ξ, the coeﬃcient on the lag of the output
gap, ρ, and the slope of the accelerationist Phillips curve, α. We compute the
optimal policy that minimizes expected loss using the euro area parameter
estimates and standard errors of Orphanides and Wieland (2000) as reported
in Table 1. The optimal values for the response coeﬃcients are somewhat
smaller than in the case without parameter uncertainty reported in Table
4:
x
ELM
π =1 .73 ,x
ELM
y =1 .89 (15)
Thus, again the Brainard principle survives. Including additional sources of
parameter uncertainty decreases the extent of policy activism.
Turning to minimax analysis with box constraints we use standard de-
viation bounds on the shocks e and u and consider three diﬀerent scenarios
for the bounds on the parameters ξ,ρ and α: (i) half the estimated stan-
dard deviation, (ii) the estimated standard deviation, and (iii) 1.5t i m e st h e
estimated standard deviation.
18Table 5: Linear model—all parameters
minimax xπ xy
(i) 0.5 standard deviation 4.62 1.81
(ii) 1.0 standard deviation 3.97 1.68
(iii) 1.5 standard deviation 2.80 1.60
Again, we conﬁrm that the Brainard principle applies under minimax
analysis with box constraints. As the width of the range on the parameters
considered increases, the policy response coeﬃcients decline.
Nonlinear model
We also compute optimal policy rules for the nonlinear version of our
model in order to show that the algorithms we use can easily be applied
to study important nonlinearities.12 We use the estimated zone width, ς =
2.0, for the zonelinear Phillips curve, equation (4) and consider parameter
uncertainty regarding the interest-rate sensitivity of aggregate demand, ξ,
the coeﬃcient on the lag of the output gap, ρ, and the slope of the zone-
linear Phillips curve, αz. The optimal values of xπ and xy under expected
loss minimization turn out to be smaller than in Table 4:
x
ELM
π =0 .51 ,x
ELM
y =1 .86 (16)
In particular, the inﬂation coeﬃcient declines substantially because of the
ﬂat zone in the Phillips curve.
As shown in Table 6 minimax analysis with box constraints continues
to obey the Brainard principle. Wider bounds for the unknown parameters
12To maintain comparability to the preceding analysis, however, we do not consider
optimal nonlinear policy rules. For an analysis of nonlinear policies under expected loss
minimization the reader is referred to Orphanides and Wieland (2000).
19imply smaller policy responses to output and inﬂation and thus less activist
policy. The response coeﬃcients now take values that do not appear unusual
or extreme compared to actual interest-rate setting by central banks.
Table 6: Nonlinear model—all parameters
minimax xπ xy
(i) 0.5 standard deviation 3.29 1.66
(ii) 1.0 standard deviation 2.77 1.45
(iii) 1.5 standard deviation 2.25 1.17
5 How to frame the use of worst-case analysis
in monetary policy design
Having shown that worst-case analysis delivers intuitive policy implications
and does not recommend extreme policy activism, the question nevertheless
remains, why central banks should use worst-case analysis and if so, how it
should be done. Reasons for considering worst-case analysis are not hard to
come by.
First, worst-case analysis does not require any conﬁdence in the central
bank’s ability to specify probability distributions regarding unknown model
parameters and economic shocks. In other words, worst-case analysis consti-
tutes a desirable tool for deriving policy recommendations when faced with
Knightian uncertainty that precludes the use of stochastic optimization.
Second, worst-case analysis provides insurance that the performance loss
is contained over a pre-speciﬁed range of uncertainties. This point is illus-
trated by Table 7, which reports the maximum losses for alternative ranges
of parameters and shocks in the linear and nonlinear model. These losses
20correspond to the values of the function f(x,v) deﬁned by equation (10) for
alternative ranges of the uncertainties summarized in v. The policy response
coeﬃcients associated with these losses have already been reported in Table
5 and Table 6.
Table 7: Maximum losses
Linear model Nonlinear model
minimax ELM minimax ELM
(i) 0.5 st. dev. 62 84 44 55
(ii) 1.0 st. dev. 100 160 66 91
(iii) 1.5 st. dev. 175 248 122 173
To give an example for the linear model, the value of 100 in the ﬁrst
column of row (ii) corresponds to the maximum loss under the minimax
policy with values of α, ξ, ρ, e and u within one standard deviation from the
mean. The respective policy coeﬃcients are xπ =3 .97 and xy =1 .68. Thus,
this rule provides an insurance policy that no combination of parameter and
shock values within one standard deviation from the mean would generate a
loss greater than 100.
The maximum loss under expected loss minimization, however, is much
larger than under minimax analysis. It is reported at a value of 160 in the
second column of row (ii). The associated policy coeﬃcients are xπ =1 .73
and xy =1 .89. Thus, moving from expected loss minimization to worst-case
analysis reduces the maximum loss by 37.5 percent.
As shown in Table 7 the maximum loss increases with the range of pos-
sible parameter values considered. Furthermore, the policy that minimizes
expected loss tends to generate consistently higher maximum losses than the
21minimax policy. Thus, worst-case analysis provides substantial insurance
beneﬁts.
The question remains how to set the bounds for the range of uncertainties
to be covered by the minimax approach. A simple cost-beneﬁt comparison
renders the choice of these ranges straightforward. The insurance beneﬁt
consists of the reduction in maximum loss reported in Table 7, while the cost
of insurance corresponds to the resulting increase in expected loss under the
minimax policy. Thus, the decision maker may simply choose the extent of
insurance cover depending on its cost in terms of expected loss. For example,
as can be seen from Table 8 the cost of one standard deviation of insurance
cover on all parameters and shocks corresponds to an increase in expected
loss from 17 to 23 in the linear model (25 percent) and from 30 to 51 in the
non-linear model (70 percent).
Table 8: Expected losses
Linear model Nonlinear model
minimax ELM minimax ELM
1.0 standard deviation 23 17 51 30
Alternatively, the cost of insurance cover by minimax analysis may be ex-
pressed in terms of the implied increase in expected inﬂation variability. For
example, the increase in expected loss from 17 to 23 discussed above is equiv-
alent to an increase in the standard deviation of inﬂation by 20 basis points
over the 20 periods considered in our numerical calculations. Presented with
the cost of insurance in these terms, a cautious policy maker may well choose
to consider a worst-case type rule as benchmark for interest-rate policy.
226 Conclusions
Using a simple estimated model of the euro area we have shown that minimax
analysis with box constraints tends to obey the Brainard principle of cau-
tionary policymaking in much the same way as expected loss minimization.
We found that simple Taylor-style policy rules optimized under a minimax
objective in the presence of general parameter and shock uncertainty do not
imply extreme policy activism. Instead, such rules are eﬀective insurance
policies limiting maximum loss over ranges of parameter values to be set by
the policy maker.
Thus, we propose to frame the use of box-constrained minimax analysis
in practical monetary policy design in the following manner. Central bank
staﬀ could compute the increase in inﬂation variability that is equivalent to
the increase in expected loss resulting from minimax policies over alternative
ranges for the uncertainties. With these measures of the cost of insurance
cover at hand, central bank decision makers could then pick a range that
they consider aﬀordable.
So far, a limitation of our analysis is the lack of forward-looking expecta-
tion terms in the Phillips curve and aggregate demand equations. In future
work, we plan to extend our algorithms to allow for such terms in the model.
Then, we will be able to address questions concerning the interaction of policy
design and private expectations formation, policy discretion versus commit-
ment and policy credibility. Another project, which we can accomplish using
the current version of our algorithms, will be to extend our analysis to con-
23sider simple nonlinear policy rules as in Orphanides and Wieland (2000).
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